Motivated by recent advances made in the study of dividend control and risk management problems involving the U.S.bankruptcy code,in this paper we follow[44]to revisit the De Finetti dividend control problem under the reorganization process and the regulator's intervention documented in U.S.Chapter 11 bankruptcy.We do this by further accommodating the fixed transaction costs on dividends to imitate the real-world procedure of dividend payments.Incorporating the fixed transaction costs transforms the targeting optimal dividend problem into an impulse control problem rather than a singular control problem,and hence computations and proofs that are distinct from[44]are needed.To account for the financial stress that is due to the more subtle concept of Chapter 11 bankruptcy,the surplus process after dividends is driven by a piece-wise spectrally negative Lévy process with endogenous regime switching.Some explicit expressions of the expected net present values under a double barrier dividend strategy,new to the literature,are established in terms of scale functions.With the help of these expressions,we are able to characterize the optimal strategy among the set of admissible double barrier dividend strategies.When the tail of the Lévy measure is log-convex,this optimal double barrier dividend strategy is then verified as the optimal dividend strategy,solving our optimal impulse control problem.
This paper explores the effects of China’s global value chain(GVC)participation on technological progress in trading-partner countries based on estimated data on value-added trade between China and 52 trading partners.We find that,first,although China’s exports lowered the total factor productivity(TFP)of its trading partners(competitive effect),its imports greatly increased trading partners’TFP(effect of scale).This implies that China’s GVC participation is beneficial to its trading partners’technological progress in the form of a considerable technology dividend effect.Second,China’s export dividend effect compensates for the negative effect of Chinese competition on trading partners’technological progress;the innovation effects attributable to China’s imports reinforce the positive effects of scale on technological progress.When innovation is factored in,the China dividend thus becomes further reinforced.Third,China’s merchandise imports have a diminishing positive effect on technological progress in trading partners as geographical distance increases,but trade in services transcends geographical boundaries,and the positive technological progress effect of China’s service imports do not diminish as distance increases.We find that the“China dividend”from China’s GVC participation is a significant contributor to technological progress in partner nations,and China’s imports are conducive to innovation and technological progress in developed countries in the long run.