The integrated linkage control problem based on attack detection is solved with the analyses of the security model including firewall, intrusion detection system （IDS） and vulnerability scan by game theory. The Nash equilibrium for two portfolios of only deploying IDS and vulnerability scan and deploying all the technologies is investigated by backward induction. The results show that when the detection rates of IDS and vulnerability scan are low, the firm will not only inspect every user who raises an alarm, but also a fraction of users that do not raise an alarm; when the detection rates of IDS and vulnerability scan are sufficiently high, the firm will not inspect any user who does not raise an alarm, but only inspect a fraction of users that raise an alarm. Adding firewall into the information system impacts on the benefits of firms and hackers, but does not change the optimal strategies of hackers, and the optimal investigation strategies of IDS are only changed in certain cases. Moreover, the interactions between IDS ＆ vulnerability scan and firewall ＆ IDS are discussed in detail.
